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Article 
 On 1 January 1973, Britain belatedly joined the European Communities [EC] after two 
previous applications had been vetoed by the French President de Gaulle.1 The entry signified a 
new episode in the country’s history, perhaps even ‘the most profound revolution in British 
foreign policy in the twentieth century’.2 After years of uncertainty over the country’s post-
imperial role, Britain was now seen to be finally embracing its European destiny. Yet, merely a 
year later, the newly elected Prime Minister Harold Wilson set out to ‘renegotiate’ Britain’s 
terms of entry and then conduct a nation-wide referendum over EC membership. Historians 
have since portrayed these renegotiations as a tiresome but necessary exercise to keep a 
deeply divided party and government together while also securing British EC-membership for 
the future.3 Stephen Wall, for example, suggests in his recently published official history of 
Britain’s relations with Europe that Wilson’s strategy was ‘the life-raft that kept a workable 
policy on Europe alive within the Labour Party’. If the Prime Minister ‘had fallen on his sword 
for the sake of pursuing the European policy he had espoused in Government [in the late 
1960s]’, so Wall argues, ‘the result would probably have been the end of his leadership and a 
Labour Party committed to withdrawal from the EEC, or deeply riven, or both’. 4  Such 
judgements stand in a wider historiographical tradition that now tends to credit Wilson for a 
deliberate strategy to secure Britain’s place in Europe, as opposed to previous accusations of an 
opportunistic and unprincipled handling of the question by contemporaries.5  
 By contrast, this article focuses on a lesser-studied aspect of the renegotiations, namely 
the detrimental effect the episode had on Britain’s standing inside the EC. It shows how 
Wilson’s domestic victory came at a heavy price internationally, strongly reinforcing doubts 
over Britain’s future role in Europe at a crucial juncture in the country’s foreign policy. This 
analysis centres primarily on the German chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who is generally credited 
for being consistently helpful and having had a major influence on the successful outcome of 
the renegotiations.6 However, using recently declassified official records as well as rare 
materials from Schmidt’s private archive, the article reconstructs how Schmidt’s initially helpful 
attitude soon gave way to widespread scepticism over British policy towards Europe, doubts 
that ultimately contributed to the re-emergence of the Franco-German axis under Schmidt and 
the French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. As a result, an ultimately insignificant episode 
nonetheless led to a deep-seated erosion of German trust in British European policy; 
stimulating doubts over Britain’s future role in Europe that were to remain a recurring feature 
over subsequent decades. In trying to explain this outcome, the article focuses primarily on the 
personal diplomacy of Wilson and Schmidt on the highest level, as well as on the radically 
different domestic environments in which the two leaders were operating. It suggests that, 
while divergent political pressures narrowed down the freedom of manoeuvre for both, 
Wilson’s profound failure at communication on the highest level nonetheless had a profound 
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impact in shaping German perceptions of the British position. A different approach by Wilson 
would probably not have resulted in a significantly different outcome of the renegotiations 
themselves; but it may well have avoided the profound sense of distrust and suspicion over 
Britain’s future role in Europe that the episode stimulated among the Germans.  
 The article first looks at the origins of the renegotiations, showing how British tactics 
were almost exclusively determined by the perceived pressures of domestic and party-political 
opinion which led to an unclear and often contradictory diplomacy towards other EC member-
states. Then, the article moves on to revisit Schmidt’s Labour Party conference speech in 
November 1974 and the following Anglo-German bilateral discussions at Chequers, an episode 
that has since acquired almost mythical qualities in shaping the eventual outcome of the 
renegotiations. Yet, this article analyses how the British largely failed in trying to gain greater 
German support for their renegotiation objectives, and that the meeting’s significance has 
almost certainly been exaggerated for domestic consumption. Indeed, it is suggested that the 
visit only reinforced Schmidt’s doubts over British sincerity and Wilson’s reliability in European 
politics. The final part of the article then puts these Anglo-German dynamics in their wider 
multilateral context, analysing the decisive European Council meetings in Paris (December 1974) 
and Dublin (March 1975). It shows how the British failed to gain any significant concessions at 
this final stage of the renegotiations, instead being confronted by a unified and largely hostile 
Franco-German axis that had formed as a response to what both countries perceived as British 
dithering and opportunism. What mattered most during the renegotiations were not the actual 
terms that were being renegotiated, but the doubts and suspicions over Britain’s future 
international role that they caused among Britain’s European partners.  
The domestic origins of the renegotiations 
When Britain finally joined the EC under the Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath, 
it did so under particularly unfavourable circumstances. While the application had been sold to 
the British public largely on the grounds of potential economic benefits, the entry coincided 
with the end of two decades of almost unprecedented growth of European economies. The 
demise of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, coupled with the quadrupling of oil prices after 
the Yom-Kippur war of 1973, had drastically worsened Western Europe’s economic situation, 
with the double threat of unemployment and inflation looming large. With regards to Britain, 
the Heath government’s economic U-turn in 1972 towards a highly expansionary monetary 
policy had put the British economy ‘on a path of sharply rising public spending, fiscal deficits 
and money supply’, whose long-term effects would haunt Britain for the remainder of the 
decade. 7   Domestic crises over industrial relations further dramatized the picture for 
contemporary observers, with days being lost to strikes amounting to 24 million in 1972 and 
the country’s trade deficit plummeting from +£285 million in 1971 to -£1,184 million in the first 
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eight months of 1973 alone.8 Though these troubles were not primarily caused by the EC, and 
though it has since been convincingly argued that Britain was not doing as badly as it appeared 
at the time, a significant part of the British public thought otherwise: when asked in an opinion 
poll about the main causes of inflation in October 1973, ‘Britain joining the EEC’ was named by 
28 per cent of people, second only to ‘the world situation’ with 31 per cent.9 During the first 
half of 1973, the number of people supporting British withdrawal had similarly risen from 20 
per cent in January to 41 per cent in July.10 
The global economic crisis also eroded the sound base on which the Conservatives had 
sought to build their political strategy for membership. At the time of the accession 
negotiations, Heath had thought it imperative to demonstrate British goodwill and ‘European 
vocation’ in his high-level encounters with the French President Pompidou and German 
Chancellor Willy Brandt, paying less attention to the exact terms under which Britain was 
entering the Community. In particular, Heath accepted that new methods of Community 
financing, such as the ‘own resources’ principle, would be negotiated prior to the accession and 
without British involvement. This was a system clearly disadvantageous to Britain: external 
tariff revenues, traditionally a significant part of the British budget, would now go directly into 
the EC’s budget; yet, the majority of EC expenses would still go into the agricultural sector, 
which was comparatively small in Britain. In short, Britain would pay more into the EC than it 
was likely to get out. At this stage, however, Heath thought that such initially disadvantageous 
policies to Britain could be adjusted and reworked through regular community mechanisms 
once Britain had joined.11 He placed particular hopes on the European Regional Fund that had 
been proposed at the Copenhagen summit in 1972; a fund that was linked to the goal of 
achieving European and Monetary Union [EMU] by 1980 and which was likely to result in 
substantial payments to Britain.12 Yet, since the subsequent economic crises made any early 
move towards EMU unlikely, the regional fund similarly did not come into fruition as planned. 
The German government insisted that the fund should not go ahead without simultaneous 
steps towards EMU, since it would otherwise only amount to inter-state financial transfers 
which the Germans would have to shoulder disproportionally.13 By early 1974, then, Heath’s 
strategy to improve the terms of entry through internal negotiations inside the Community 
framework was widely seen to have failed: even for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
[FCO], which had always been an enthusiastic advocate of EC membership, it had become 
painfully clear ‘that it is not all plain sailing to “join now and negotiate later”’.14 
For the Labour Party, on the other hand, Heath’s ill-fated strategy re-opened strong 
internal divisions over the very principle of British EC-membership. Though a majority of Labour 
MPs had been in favour of entry when party leader Harold Wilson had launched Britain’s 
second application as Prime Minister in May 1967, the application’s subsequent rejection by 
the French and Labour’s electoral defeat in 1970 had triggered a significant swing against 
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Europe within the party.15 A motion calling for unconditional opposition to British entry was 
only narrowly defeated at the party conference in October 1970; on 25 May 1971, James 
Callaghan, at the time seen as Wilson’s strongest rival for party leadership, effectively declared 
his own opposition in a well-publicised and highly populist speech.16 Not only did Europe offer 
an ideal opportunity to attack one of Heath’s key policies, but the question also fed into wider 
ideological tensions inside the Labour Party, with key proponents and opponents of EC-
membership trying to win over a largely agnostic middle-ground in an increasingly polarized 
environment.17 In order to prevent a potentially fatal split of the party as well as to secure his 
own leadership, then, Harold Wilson spoke out against Heath’s terms of entry in October 1971, 
proposing to ‘renegotiate’ them and putting the question of membership to the British people 
in a nationwide referendum or an election. In so doing, the skilful tactician Wilson managed to 
appease the party’s opponents to EC-membership while, crucially, also avoiding committing 
himself to withdrawal.18 Labour’s election manifesto in March 1974 correspondingly called for a 
‘fundamental renegotiation of the terms of entry’, spelling out seven objectives: major changes 
in the Common Agricultural Policy, fairer methods of financing the Community budget, the 
withdrawal from proposals for EMU, retention of national powers for regional, industrial and 
fiscal policies, no harmonisation of VAT, and safeguards for the economic interests of the 
Commonwealth and developing countries. 19  Out of these seven objectives, the most 
controversial issues were Britain’s share of the Community budget and its trade relations with 
the Commonwealth, which would remain at the centre stage throughout the renegotiations. 
For the time being, however, the Labour Party’s surprising return to power in March 1974 
meant that Wilson suddenly had to deliver on his pledges.  
As a result, domestic concerns took clear precedence over diplomatic objectives in the 
government’s formulation of European policy from the very outset. For the new Foreign 
Secretary Callaghan, for example, it seemed ‘necessary, if the Government was to survive intact, 
to test all we did against the manifesto on which we had fought the election’. 20  He 
consequently soon found himself in direct confrontation with his FCO staff, many of whom 
worried about the long-term effects of the renegotiations on Britain’s standing in Europe.21 
Tensions came to a head in March 1974, when Callaghan prepared for his first appearance at 
the European Council of Ministers. Having just received a draft speech, he complained to his 
officials that it was ‘too warm’ and did not take into account the ‘substantial concessions from 
the Community’ he wanted. He claimed to be particularly ‘worried about personalities in the 
FCO: were the FCO zealots for integration? … [T]he Labour Party, and he himself, were much 
less European than the FCO’.22 Wilson, professing to have similar fears, immediately moved 
responsibility for the renegotiations from the FCO to the Cabinet Office’s European division, 
apparently to avoid the possibility that FCO officials would ‘use their position to override the 
interests of other departments’.23 Instead, he set up two cabinet committees chaired by him 
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and Callaghan, allowing them to play out the pro- and anti-Europeans against each other while 
dispassionately presiding over the outcome themselves.24  
While it is evident from today’s perspective that both Wilson and Callaghan were clearly 
working towards continued British membership from the outset,25 it is similarly clear that they 
had little idea how the manifesto demands could actually be achieved. ‘At a first reading of the 
Treaty of Accession’, Callaghan bluntly told a group of assembled British Ambassadors from EC 
countries shortly after the election, he had found it ‘difficult to see how we could achieve our 
objectives on agriculture and the budget without amending it, but this needed further study’. 
When Sir Michael Palliser, Britain’s permanent representative to the European Communities, 
interjected that any treaty change required unanimous agreement by EC member-states, 
Callaghan snapped that ‘if the French wanted a showdown they would have one. … He thought 
de Gaulle had been right in thinking that it was against French interests to let us into the 
Community’. It was important that his European counterparts ‘must not be allowed to think 
that renegotiation was not a fundamental question’. Though Callaghan’s outburst was clearly 
designed for a domestic audience, it also reveals some deeper unease over European 
integration that lay behind the façade of the renegotiations. It was important to know ‘whether 
the Community was serious about EMU and European Union’, Callaghan confided to his 
ambassadors, ‘if these items could be left out of the account, it might be possible to do a deal 
on such matters as the CAP and the budget’.26 This tension between the government’s public 
preoccupation with the economic terms of membership and the underlying unease over the 
political principles behind the European integration process was to become a recurrent feature 
of the renegotiations.   
In light of British confusion, it is of little surprise that the German government was 
initially uncertain about the seriousness of British demands. On the one hand, most internal 
assessments feared that the renegotiations could trigger formal treaty changes rendering the 
EC ineffective for a long time: the resulting changes in the EC’s institutional shape or political 
character, the Germans thought, would be ‘too high a price’ for continuing British 
membership.27 On the other hand, however, it was also estimated that Labour’s return to 
government and adjustment to the political realities inside the EC would soon strengthen the 
more moderate voices inside the party. Thus, the Germans adopted a ‘wait-and-see’ policy, 
appearing sympathetic towards reasonable demands while strictly rejecting anything that 
would go against the principles of the Community.28 As the British Ambassador to Bonn 
Nicholas Henderson reported back to London, the Germans remained ‘convinced that the 
British interest lies in remaining within the Community, and that, unless irrationality prevails, 
we are bound to stay in, if not out of any belief in the idea of Europe, at any rate from the hard 
calculation of where our own national interest lies’.29 In any case, there were more pressing 
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issues at stake for the German government in early 1974, making British demands seem like an 
irrelevant sideshow at best. 
Franco-German rapprochement and British self-exclusion 
On 16 May 1974, Helmut Schmidt was elected German Chancellor after Willy Brandt’s 
resignation as a result of the Guillaume affair. This change was widely welcomed in Britain, 
since Schmidt’s reputation as an ‘Atlanticist’ with correspondingly little enthusiasm for 
European integration had only recently been reinforced by a series of public appearances.30 In 
the autumn of 1973, for example, Schmidt had claimed at the IISS’s annual conference in 
London in a ‘frank, abrasive, rambling and highly personal fashion’ how Western Europe was 
‘no political entity’ and ‘assumed to be stronger than it actually is’;31 a couple of weeks later, he 
was described on BBC radio as being cool and half-hearted towards European integration.32 
Indeed, the German Embassy in London repeatedly warned against widespread British 
impressions ‘that Minister Schmidt was sceptical or even hostile towards the [European] 
Community’.33 While the Embassy had tried to rectify such impressions by organising a series 
high-profile interviews and public speeches for Schmidt’s visit to London in January 1974, the 
effects of this campaign were somewhat diminished by his subsequent outburst at the 
Washington Energy Conference where, clashing heavily with the French Foreign Minister Jobert, 
he claimed that ‘if he had to choose between the US and France, he would choose the 
former’.34 In the eyes of the FCO, this was evidence that the Germans were now ‘more than 
ever reluctant to do anything which might alienate the US for the sake of a French conception 
of Europe’, and that Schmidt in particular was ‘certainly not likely to push the Federal 
Government in the direction of a more forward Western European policy’.35 Only Henderson 
warned about such excessive optimism in Whitehall. In his view, Schmidt was ‘not likely to see 
any alternative for the Federal Republic than progress over Europe’, though he would be ‘less 
visionary in language and more pragmatic in tactics than his predecessor’.36  
In fact, the British were wrong to interpret Schmidt`s frequent outbursts as signs of half-
heartedness towards European integration. While Schmidt had indeed been a virulent critic of 
Gaullist conceptions of a ‘little Europe’ of Six throughout the 1960s, he was at the same time 
firmly convinced that the interdependence of European economies, as well as the FRG’s history 
and exposed geopolitical situation, simply necessitated to bind the country as closely as 
possible into multilateral frameworks like the EC. Schmidt was particularly influenced by John F. 
Kennedy’s concept of an ‘Atlantic Community’, which envisioned a transatlantic alliance resting 
on equally strong American and European pillars.37 Being attached to visions of a bigger, more 
outward-looking Europe, he thus believed that de Gaulle’s ‘egocentric and egoistic rejection of 
Britain’s entry’ had ‘prevented greater European integration since 1963’ by deliberately 
accepting ‘unilateral disruptions in the West’ and provoking ‘only bitterness and suspicion 
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amongst other Europeans and in Washington’.38 Such differences over the degree of European 
autonomy from the American superpower culminated in the diplomatic fallout following Henry 
Kissinger’s ill-fated call for the ‘Year of Europe’ in the early 1970s.39 In 1974, however, the 
election of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing as French President triggered a marked change in French 
European policy. In contrast to his predecessors, Giscard defined his strong commitment to the 
EC not against partnership with the United States, but connected his support of European 
integration to a renewed emphasis on Franco-American cooperation, thereby removing many 
obstacles that had jeopardized the transatlantic relationship in the 1960s.40 This matched well 
with Schmidt’s personal attachment to a strong EC firmly embedded within the transatlantic 
alliance. After his first bilateral meeting with Giscard as President, Schmidt therefore put on the 
record how Giscard’s forthcoming and cooperative attitude had contrasted with earlier Franco-
German encounters ‘like day and night’, being correspondingly keen to play down the likely 
disruptive impact of the renegotiations.41 In conversation with Giscard, Schmidt claimed that 
Wilson only wanted to beat time ‘in the hope of an early opportunity to dissolve Parliament … 
and then in the end stay in the Market with a comfortable majority’;42 a week later, he similarly 
used a confidential tête-à-tête to seduce Wilson with the vision of a tripartite leadership of the 
EC by France, Germany, and Britain. ‘All three countries had an essential voice in Community 
affairs’, he told him confidentially, and ‘it was the three Governments concerned who really 
mattered’.43  
In spite of such proclaimed goodwill, however, the renegotiations contrasted 
unfavourably with the rapid intensification of Franco-German cooperation under Schmidt and 
Giscard. This was most evident in the field of economic policy, where Wilson seemed unwilling 
to follow Schmidt’s course of fiscal restraint and budgetary consolidation, whereas Giscard 
quickly embarked upon substantial economic reforms even against significant domestic 
opposition.44 These tendencies did not bypass Schmidt, who asserted in conversation with EC 
Commission President Ortoli in June 1974 that, while France, Germany, and the Benelux 
countries all shared ‘the same will and the same goals’ in their economic policies, he was ‘not 
sure whether that applied to England as well’, doubting whether ‘Wilson had analysed Britain’s 
long-term interests sufficiently’.45 In Schmidt’s eyes, the renegotiations only distracted from the 
real issues at stake. There was a ‘fatal tendency of the English to regard their EEC-membership 
as cause of all their economic ills’, he mused in an internal memorandum in May 1974, which 
would ‘not only have negative effects inside the EEC, but will also engage the strength of 
purpose in economic policies in the wrong directions’.46  
Such perceptions of British obstructionism extended into the field of institutional reform, 
where Schmidt and Giscard were eager to translate their European convictions into more 
concrete initiatives, such as the introduction of direct elections to the European parliament or 
greater use of Qualified Majority Voting [QMV]. The British, by contrast, felt unable to agree to 
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any significant institutional reforms without having settled the membership question first, 
much to the dismay of most other member-states. ‘Giscard’s strong engagement for European 
progress, which had been completely evident to me for quite some time, has certainly 
impressed the other participants’, Schmidt put on record after an informal dinner by European 
heads of government in September 1974, whereas ‘England’s position was explicitly criticized 
from all sides. … Wilson surely has left the impression of a still uncertain English position’.47 
Indeed, Wilson himself recalled afterwards how ‘some of our partners thought that 
renegotiation was a “bore”’, as well as ‘the slight feeling that some of them were assuming that 
Britain would leave the Community’ in any case.48 This mirrored the FCO’s junior minister Roy 
Hattersley’s experiences at the Council of Ministers the week before, who had similarly 
detected a ‘feeling on the part of the others that Britain was not really part of the process 
under discussion. This was never stated but there was an implicit, if disguised, assumption that 
Britain would not be there when these developments were realized. There was also the 
slightest hint that if Britain is going to leave the Community, 'twere better done quickly’.49 This 
wider sense of British exclusion from European developments would become more pronounced 
once the renegotiations began in earnest in late 1974.  
Schmidt’s Labour Party conference speech and the non-event of Chequers  
During their first months, the renegotiations had made surprisingly swift progress on 
many non-essential matters, benefitting greatly from close Anglo-German cooperation on lower 
diplomatic levels. Already in June 1974, the Auswärtiges Amt noted how ‘the pro-Europeans in 
Cabinet and in the Whitehall administration’ had done a remarkable job in putting the British 
demands ‘as far as possible into a communitarian design’.50 In any case, since Wilson was 
heading a minority government, everybody was expecting him to call an early election before 
embarking upon more substantial negotiations. 51  Yet, while the October 1974 elections 
returned Wilson with a majority of three, they did not increase his freedom of manoeuvre 
significantly. Not only did they further strengthen the left-wing of the party, with nearly half of 
the newly elected MPs joining the Tribune Group, but they also boosted opposition to EC-
membership inside the party, with the vocal opponent Tony Benn coming top in the Labour 
Party’s National Executive Council [NEC] selections in November.52 This posed a dilemma for 
Wilson and Callaghan: since they had made their position completely dependent on the 
renegotiated terms, they could not counter what they perceived as growing opposition to EC-
membership by suddenly advocating a more positive stance. In order to break up this domestic 
deadlock, Callaghan came up with the idea of inviting Schmidt to address the Labour Party 
conference in November 1974.53 This allowed the government to have a powerful argument for 
continuing British membership articulated at the conference without being personally 
associated with it.  
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 Schmidt’s appearance has since acquired almost mythical qualities and does not need to 
be reconstructed in detail here. By all accounts, it is evident that the German chancellor had the 
desired impact, with the speech being broadcasted live on nationwide TV and discussed 
prominently in all major newspapers.54 Indeed, Henderson’s diplomatic despatch almost reads 
like a heroic tale, clearly influenced by his own support of continuing British membership.55 
Schmidt had been ‘greeted by hostile posters, boos, angry faces and shaking fists’, Henderson 
recorded, with the chancellor having to address an audience ‘that had shown itself before his 
own eyes to be unruly and responsive to extremism, that only the day before had passed an 
anti-European resolution and that contained prominent members who had expressed their 
intention of walking out in the middle of his speech’. Yet, Schmidt transformed the situation 
almost single-handedly. He refrained from his initial inclination to address the European 
question ‘with all desirable quality’,56 instead launching into an analysis of the essential need 
for international cooperation in light of the dangers of a worldwide recession, which he then 
linked to ‘the desire of your German comrades to have you British comrades on our side within 
the Community’. Though putting himself ‘in the position of a man who, in front of ladies and 
gentlemen from the Salvation Army, tries to convince them of the advantages of drinking’, he 
nonetheless stated his case bluntly, consciously appealing to socialist solidarity.57 Afterwards, 
as Henderson noted, Schmidt’s speech was described by one former and one present Labour 
Cabinet Minister as ‘the most brilliant performance that they had ever heard at a Labour Party 
Conference’; another apparently widely-held view was ‘that if any single speech could have 
made a difference to opinion and events Herr Schmidt's should have done so’.58 Even Tony 
Benn praised Schmidt’s ‘very witty and amusing speech’ in his diaries, though fearing that now 
‘Healey thinks he will replace Harold Wilson and then it will be the Healey/Schmidt Anglo-
German axis against Giscard d’Estaing – a most alarming prospect’.59  
Yet, such evident success has tended to overshadow the effect that the experience had 
on Schmidt himself, in particular since his unequivocal support of British membership 
contrasted unfavourably with Wilson’s public ambiguity. In October 1974, he had already put 
his doubts over Wilson’s ultimate intentions to his close friend Alastair Buchan, whom he had 
known since the 1950s. ‘What was wrong with Britain?’, he asked, appearing particularly 
worried about Wilson: ‘From discussions with him, he no longer knew whether the PM still 
wanted Britain in the Community or not. … He [Schmidt] was an Anglophile and would see 
Britain leave the Community with real regret, but the French would be happy to see her go; 
they were convinced that the British were not yet really committed to Europe and should not 
be allowed to hang up European business until they had properly made up their minds’.60 
Schmidt simply could not understand why the marginal issues at stake in the renegotiations 
were portrayed as being so important as to make Britain‘s continued membership dependent 
on them. As an internal German document put it, Schmidt believed that all renegotiation 
demands could be solved easily ‘if you know where you are going. At least, [he] cannot believe 
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that the majority of the Labour Party conference believes that Britain’s long-term future 
depended on EC-payments with regards to agriculture, or the regional and social funds’. As for 
the budget question, he sarcastically pointed out how Britain’s total EC contributions were less 
than the monthly average of its trade deficit.61  
Thus, the Anglo-German discussions at Chequers following Schmidt’s conference speech 
offered a welcome opportunity to clear up potential misunderstandings, as well as to get a 
clearer picture of each other’s positions. For the Germans, the prime objective was to receive 
an unequivocal personal commitment from Wilson ‘that he would support continuing British 
membership’ after the renegotiations would be concluded.62 This was particularly important to 
Schmidt, who believed that a political lead from the very top would be decisive in swaying the 
final outcome of the referendum. The outcome of the referendum ‘very much depends on the 
recommendation made by the British government’, he told the press in November, ‘the actual 
decision must be made in the bosom of the government and one hopes that the British nation 
will follow the government and their recommendation’.63 Such demands on Wilson to take up a 
clear position in support of continuing EC-membership were widely shared by most other 
member-states, as EC Commissioner Finn Gundelach impressed on the British in October 1974: 
‘None of the Eight would take the subject seriously until they had heard a firm assurance from 
the Prime Minister that he wanted Britain to remain in the Community and would work for 
this’.64 Even Henry Kissinger believed that the referendum would ‘fail unless the Government 
backs it [since] the British people are against the Market. So Wilson can certainly make it fail’.65 
At that stage, British civil servants and senior ministers had also become alarmed by 
Wilson’s evident lack of engagement. The Prime Minister’s Office, for example, strongly urged 
Wilson to ‘reassure Schmidt, to the extent he considers possible, about the Government’s 
intention to secure a positive decision on continued membership of the Community if 
renegotiation is successful’. This would be ‘crucial in determining the extent to which Schmidt is 
prepared to be helpful to us’.66 Callaghan, by contrast, had already come a long way from his 
initial scepticism, thanks largely to his frequent consultations with European counterparts. Over 
the past couple of months, as the Germans somewhat paternalistically observed, Callaghan’s 
approach had become gradually ‘more constructive and communitarian’.67 But this was no 
substitute for the Prime Minister’s personal involvement, and Callaghan himself clearly grasped 
the importance of engaging Wilson more closely. ‘You said you would prefer to keep these 
matters within the negotiating channels where they have been so far’, he wrote to Wilson in 
October 1974, ‘but I hold the view that Schmidt and Giscard will wish to play a large personal 
part and that at a later stage you will have to come in on things’.68 Thus, the Chequers 
discussions offered a welcome opportunity to engage the PM’s personal interest in the 
European question. 
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According to the recollections of key participants, the discussions at Chequers indeed 
‘launched Wilson into a much more positive phase of politics toward Europe’.69 Roy Jenkins, for 
example, asserts that Schmidt ‘had played a key role in the evolution of Wilson’s position’ and 
‘arouse[d] Wilson’s interest in the grand league of foreign policy involvement in a way that had 
not been so since his relationship with Lyndon Johnson in the late 1960s’.70 This was certainly 
the impression Wilson himself wanted to convey. Shortly after Schmidt’s departure, he told 
Callaghan that he was now ‘feeling a good deal happier about the possibility of an acceptable 
outcome to the renegotiation of the terms. … Since the Federal Chancellor had left, he had 
been going through the Party Manifesto, and had come to the conclusion that a successful 
outcome was not all that impossible’.71 Surprisingly, however, Wilson’s epiphany seems to have 
completely bypassed the Germans. As their record notes, Wilson seemed ‘interested in Britain 
remaining member of the EC, but without strong involvement; uniformed about details’.72 
These were also Schmidt’s personal impressions, who afterwards told Giscard on the phone 
that Wilson now ‘realizes, but doesn’t admit, that he had made a bad mistake by calling for 
“renegotiation” in opposition. At the moment, he prioritizes the manifesto and party unity; 
Callaghan is, in comparison, markedly pro-European’.73  
Partly, of course, such contradictory recollections can be explained by the fact that both 
sides had entered the meeting with quite different expectations. When Schmidt asked Wilson 
at Chequers to offer an unequivocal promise that ‘the Prime Minister would be able to make it 
clear to his partners that he and his colleagues would be willing to advise the British people in 
favour of remaining in the European Community, provided that Britain could get acceptable 
terms’, he was essentially after a reassurance from Wilson ‘that basically he himself wanted 
Britain to stay in the European Community’. Yet, though Wilson responded by claiming that he 
was ‘absolutely prepared to give … the assurance that the Federal Chancellor had sought on his 
position in relation to continuing British membership: if the outcome of the renegotiation 
produced terms of membership which were satisfactory, continuing British membership would 
be good for Britain and good for Europe, and he would be prepared to put his weight behind 
acceptance of continuing British membership’,74 this clearly stepped short of the unambiguous 
statement Schmidt had been pressing for. Indeed, the German record even notes that Wilson 
had shown ‘no readiness to publicly declare the wish to remain inside the EC before final 
renegotiation results were known’.75 When Wilson subsequently repeated his line in public at 
the annual banquet of London Majors shortly afterwards, a speech often taken as evidence of 
the alleged shift in Wilson’s position,76 his tone struck the Germans as ‘demonstratively 
neutral’.77 Indeed, the precise passage from Wilson’s speech reads as follows: ‘[W]e will work 
wholeheartedly for the success of the European venture if we get the terms for which we have 
asked and the endorsement of the British people. But if we do not, we believe that our national 
interest would not be served by accepting a situation which would undermine our economic 
strength, and our capacity to protect our national as well as our wider international interests’.78 
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This may have seemed like a significant change in Wilson’s attitude to attentive British 
observers, but it was hardly enough to convince the plain-speaking Schmidt of British sincerity.  
While Wilson’s reluctance to throw himself fully into the renegotiations can again be 
largely explained by the domestic pressures he was feeling, it may also be seen to illustrate his 
more general indifference towards the EC. As his personal adviser Bernard Donoughue put it, 
Wilson ‘did not seem to care too much about the policies as policies, and might happily have 
argued a different position had the manifesto required it’. 79  Instead, Wilson was a 
‘Commonwealth man’, strongly influenced by his wartime experience at the Board of Trade and 
with extensive family links to Australia.80 Such backgrounds could occasionally spill over into the 
policy area, in particular with regards to the controversial question of prolonged transitional 
periods for New Zealand agricultural imports, which Wilson raised at Chequers against official 
advice from Whitehall and Callaghan. 81 Yet, Wilson told Schmidt how ‘the British people did not 
understand why they could not go on buying New Zealand butter. … If the British people were 
to be persuaded to support continued membership of the Community in a referendum, it 
would help for him to be able to say to them that Britain would be able to go on buying food 
from abroad when it was cheaper to do so’.82 He ‘acknowledged that Mr Callaghan was an 
agnostic on this and Mr Healey an atheist, but he attached great importance to it. New Zealand 
had supplied butter and cheese for over one hundred years to the UK. …. He was appalled by 
the “weevils or rather moles” working away in Brussels trying to undermine this’.83 Yet, the 
intervention made little impression on Schmidt, who afterwards mused with Giscard on the 
phone whether Wilson ‘realizes that the period of cheap food prices on the world market is 
over for the time being’ and that the EC’s agricultural policy was actually keeping British prices 
down at that stage.84 
More generally, Wilson’s apathy towards the European question also matched the 
general air of ‘lassitude verging on melancholy’ surrounding his final years in office.85 With his 
secret plans for retirement well under way, Wilson consciously adopted a ‘hands-off’ approach 
for his last term in office, with ministers being largely free to run their own departments.86 
Shortly after his election, for example, Wilson bluntly told his cabinet how they were “going to 
do the bloody work while I have an easy time.”87 It became increasingly evident to insiders that 
Wilson ‘had been slowing up, psychologically and perhaps also physically … the demonic energy 
of the 1960s was gone, and he no longer had the desire, or the conceit, to take everything upon 
himself’.88 Henderson, for example, was repeatedly struck by ‘how little the Prime Minister 
seemed to have been following the European story … Clearly he sees no political advantage in 
becoming too personally involved’.89 Such detachment may also have been influenced by 
health problems. Donoughue, for example, recalls a meeting of European heads of government 
where Wilson had been ‘very rough on his opponents around the table’, before declaring that 
‘he saw no point in going on’. Though he claimed to be staying away from the next session in 
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order ‘to underline his alleged willingness to pull out of the renegotiations if necessary’, the real 
reason was that he had to see his doctor about a heart problem triggered by an emergency 
landing the week before.90 All of this stood in marked contrast to Wilson’s approach in the 
1960s, where he had enthusiastically toured European capitals to sound out the possibilities of 
British membership.91 
Yet, Wilson’s lack of effective engagement with his European counterparts also reveals 
the more fundamental contradictions ingrained in his European policy. Though repeatedly 
professing that his stance was completely dependent on the renegotiated terms, these terms 
actually did not matter the slightest in determining his position on the principle of EC-
membership: what mattered to him was only that he had something to show for the British 
electorate. At Chequers, these contradictions occasionally crept out into the open, for example 
when Callaghan asserted that ‘what happened in the referendum would depend not so much 
on the results of the renegotiation as on the atmosphere and situation at the time’. Schmidt 
was quick to pick up on this remark. He ‘had understood the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Secretary to imply that in many respects psychology mattered more than the detailed “fine 
print” of negotiation’, Schmidt replied. ‘If the psychological needs were of that weight’, 
however, then ‘the British Government might want to ask themselves whether they were 
proceeding psychologically prudently in filling in their needs only step by step’. 92 In effect, this 
meant that Schmidt had called Wilson’s bluff. After all, Wilson had already understood in 1966 
that Britain simply had no other ‘long-term choice but to enter the EEC’, even though he may 
still have fostered illusions about the concrete terms of membership attainable.93  
It is, of course, easy to read too much into largely anecdotal evidence from 
contemporary observers. From today’s perspective, it seems indeed like Wilson’s tactical 
manoeuvring on the European question was part of a deliberate long-term strategy to secure 
continuing membership. He certainly claimed so afterwards, for example when U.S. President 
Gerald Ford congratulated him on the positive referendum outcome in July 1975. ‘We couldn’t 
have gotten that vote earlier’, Wilson boasted, which was why he ‘played it cool, acted as 
though we had to be convinced and only pulled out the stops at the end’.94 Nonetheless, it 
seems that Wilson played his role rather too well. When, in December 1974, U.S. Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger suggested to Giscard that the British were conducting the renegotiations 
‘in order to stay in, not to get out’, the French President responded that ‘this is Callaghan, not 
Wilson. Wilson wants a satisfaction he can’t get’. 95  Failing to establish a confidential 
relationship with either Schmidt or Giscard, Wilson’s personal position thus became largely 
identical with his public stance, at least in the perceptions of his European counterparts. 
Such concerns over Wilson’s personal stance mattered increasingly once the 
renegotiations moved towards the highest diplomatic level after November 1974. Though most 
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demands had been already sorted out through the EC’s regular mechanisms, two remaining 
questions – Britain’s contributions to the EC budget and its trade relationship with the 
Commonwealth – inevitably required the personal involvement of heads of government. Thus, 
the British believed that Schmidt’s personal attitude would be crucial in shaping the final 
outcome of the renegotiations. Patrick Nairne, at the time second permanent secretary at the 
Cabinet Office, was outspoken internally that Britain’s stock in the EC was ‘not high. … There 
are those (in Bonn and Paris) who say that, if we are so foolish as to think that Britain's interest 
lies in withdrawal, the Community should not strive to keep us in’. The British strategy had to 
be ‘to persuade the Germans – at the highest political level and as soon as possible – to meet us 
in principle on the budget issue. If we can succeed in this, we must encourage them to bring 
along the French’.96 Since the final renegotiations would take place in the newly created 
European Council, the regular meetings of EC heads of government and state, Wilson’s personal 
diplomacy would be decisive in convincing his European counterparts about British goodwill 
and sincerity.97  
Wilson versus the Franco-German axis: the Paris and Dublin Summits, 1974-5 
It was no coincidence that the Chequers meeting took place immediately prior to a 
European summit of heads of government and state in Paris from 9-10 December 1974, 
proposed by Giscard to make headway on the institutional reforms he had developed with 
Schmidt over the summer. In particular, Giscard was looking to institutionalise regular meetings 
of heads of government through the creation of the European Council, the reintroduction of 
Qualified Majority Voting [QMV] in non-essential matters, as well as direct elections to the 
European Parliament. Since most of these proposals stood against the grain of traditional 
French policies, the Germans hoped to use the summit as an opportunity to ‘irrevocably codify 
the significant change in the French position despite British reservations’.98 The British, by 
contrast, were not ready to contemplate any ‘decisions in the institutional field which could 
antagonise opinion in this country’. 99 As Callaghan explained to Genscher, ‘he could not 
advance one tenth of a millimetre on the subject of institutions until the renegotiations were 
over and until it was known whether we were going to remain in the Community’.100 Instead, 
the British wanted to use the summit to make headway on the renegotiations, which were now 
nearing their climax.  
Apart from the Commonwealth question, the only major issue that still had to be 
resolved by the end of 1974 was Britain’s disproportionate contribution to the EC budget, 
which all EC member-states except France acknowledged to be a problem in light of Britain’s 
precarious economic situation.101 The British Treasury, for example, had calculated that the 
British proportion of the budget would rise to 24 per cent by 1980, whereas its share of the EC’s 
GNP would be only 14 per cent.102 France, however, argued that any formula accommodating 
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British demands would jeopardize the recently introduced ‘own resources’ principle under 
which agricultural levies and tariff revenues of member-states went straight into the EC’s 
budget.103 The Germans stood somewhere in between. Though they agreed with France that 
the principles of Community financing should not be jeopardized, they were also aware of the 
alleged importance of the budget question in the British domestic debate. This resulted in an 
interdepartmental conflict at Bonn. Whereas the Auswärtiges Amt, concerned primarily with 
the implications of the renegotiations for German foreign policy, strongly emphasized the need 
for significant concessions in order to help Wilson out domestically, the Finanzministerium 
questioned the need for any further financial contributions whatsoever, regarding any ‘German 
initiative for good-will formulae to accommodate British demands [as] … inexpedient’.104 
Finance Minister Hans Apel in particular decided to play hardball, cleverly playing on now 
widespread perceptions of British opportunism. At a dinner party in July 1974, for example, he 
exclaimed that ‘the British no longer counted; it was worth little or nothing to the Federal 
Republic to keep the British in the Community and if they made what he considered to be the 
cardinal error of deciding that they were better off outside the Community then he, Apel, for 
one was not going to stop them. They could return to their historical position as a small island 
off the shore of North Eastern [sic!] Europe’.105 Indeed, Schmidt’s personal freedom of 
manoeuvre on the budget question was also significantly constrained by domestic 
circumstances at that stage. As a result of the economic crisis, he had already been forced to 
stall some of Brandt’s earlier reforms, much to the dismay of the left-wing of his party, which 
meant that any substantial financial concession to Britain was unlikely to go down well with 
both party and the public.106 In order to justify any additional concessions domestically, 
Schmidt thus needed an unequivocal British commitment to Europe first. As he told journalists 
in an off-the-record discussion in October 1974, he found it extremely risky politically to burden 
the German taxpayer with any additional financial commitment without having anything to 
show for in return.107  
In the end, the Paris Summit brought significant advances on both the budget question 
and institutional reform. On the budget, the heads of government instructed Council and 
Commission to set up ‘as soon as possible a correcting mechanism of a general application 
which, in the framework of the system of “own resources” and in harmony with its normal 
functioning, based on objective criteria and taking into consideration in particular the 
suggestions made to this effect by the British Government, could prevent … the possible 
development of situations unacceptable for a member-state and incompatible with the smooth 
working of the Community’.108 This ensured that the system of ‘own resources’ would not be 
changed and that a rebate would be applicable to all member-states, while it also meant that 
British demands were now on the agenda and could no longer simply be ignored. In the 
institutional field, it was in turn agreed to re-introduce QMV, to have direct elections to the 
European Parliament by 1978, and to instruct the Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans to 
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work on a report towards the future progress towards European Union. Most significantly, the 
summit also institutionalised regular meetings of the EC’s heads of state and government in the 
form of the European Council.109 Nonetheless, Schmidt and Giscard afterwards agreed over the 
phone that the ‘methods and course of events had been disappointing’. Again, they were 
particularly dismissive of Wilson’s lacklustre performance, though Schmidt thought that the 
British PM had at least been ‘dragged into the “European game” which makes it very difficult to 
him to retreat’.110  
Whatever Schmidt’s and Giscard’s misgivings, Wilson was now clearly working towards 
continued membership on the domestic front, performing ‘the subtle art of making it gradually 
clear to the world, with a series of hints, nudges and nuances, that he had changed his mind 
about the Common Market’.111 Again, Wilson’s stance formed anything but a clear and 
coherent policy. On 5 December 1974, for example, he reported to his cabinet about his 
meetings with Schmidt and Giscard in a decidedly neutral tone, emphasising how he had 
‘impressed strongly on Herr Schmidt that we were not concerned only with the budget issue, 
but attached great importance to each of the seven renegotiation aims set out in the February 
Election Manifesto’. For the first time, however, he also dropped a hint that ‘the logic of the 
position which he had consistently taken up meant that for his part he would be prepared, if all 
the Manifesto commitments were satisfactorily met, to recommend to the British people that 
they should support the terms obtained’.112 In light of continuing divisions over the European 
question in Cabinet, Wilson also brokered the famous ‘agreement to differ’ in January 1975, 
which said that if ‘a minority of the Cabinet were unable to agree with the majority decision on 
what the Government’s recommendation should be, the Ministers in the minority should be 
free to advocate a different view during the referendum campaign’.113 By the time of the 
decisive European Council at Dublin in March 1975, Wilson’s benevolent intensions had 
become evident to everybody in Whitehall. As Donoughue recalls, the briefings ‘were 
conducted wholly on the assumption that: 1) the terms already agreed were satisfactory; 2) 
Wilson and Callaghan would recommend “yes” and 3) a majority of the cabinet would 
recommend “yes”.’ When Callaghan teased with the possibility of an inconclusive result, 
‘Wilson interrupted sharply to state that we must have a positive result and must be prepared 
to work all day and night to achieve it ‘.114  
 In the meantime, Schmidt was also preparing the ground for a deal in Germany. In 
various speeches during the early months of 1975, he emphasized that it was Germany’s 
responsibility to make financial sacrifices in order to preserve European integration and to keep 
Britain in Europe, even though such concessions potentially meant curbing social spending even 
more.115 At a session of the SPD’s executive council, he warned the party’s left-wing that 
German support for British membership would inevitably further narrow down financial 
margins for their proposed reforms in education, youth, health, and social policies. 116 
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Nonetheless, government departments remained hopelessly divided over the issue, with the 
Finanzministerium and the Auswärtiges Amt not even being able to agree on a joint brief for 
Dublin and submitting two separate, contradictory briefs to Schmidt instead.117 Schmidt thus 
clearly needed further reassurances about Britain’s intensions. Therefore, he sent his close 
confidante Wischnewski to tell the British that ‘the Chancellor would want to show great 
readiness to help the UK over the renegotiation terms: but he should also want to get some 
further assurance from the Prime Minister, perhaps in restricted session, that he was prepared 
to throw himself wholeheartedly behind the new terms in submitting the issue to the people in 
the referendum’.118  
 Yet, the question remained essentially a chicken-and-egg problem: Wilson would only 
offer such a pledge if he had received significantly better terms first; Schmidt in turn would only 
offer better terms after an unequivocal commitment by Wilson. The British were clear that 
German hopes for such a British commitment at Dublin were illusory. As Henderson told the 
German side, Wilson and Callaghan could ‘only agree to a compromise for themselves. They 
cannot commit the British Cabinet. It is up for the Cabinet to decide’. If Wilson prejudiced the 
decision of the Cabinet, there was a danger that as of yet uncommitted members would deny 
their loyalty to the Prime Minister.119 Immediately prior to the summit, Callaghan declared that 
Wilson would ‘not even give his “private assurance” that he would push through a successful 
negotiating outcome, as such an assurance would eventually become public and negatively 
prejudice all hopes for a positive decision in Cabinet, majority of the party, and Parliament’.120 
This was a message to which Schüler, another member of Schmidt’s inner circle, reacted 
‘immediately and strongly’. ‘He wondered what sense summit meetings had if Heads of 
Government did not have authority to make decisions on behalf of their countries’, Schüler told 
Henderson, ‘this struck him and he had no doubt it would strike the Federal Chancellor as an 
absurdity’.121 Schmidt even intervened personally to influence the British position. In a letter to 
his old friend Denis Healey in February 1975, he claimed that, while ‘all partners of Great Britain 
in the Community are willing to contribute to a satisfactory solution’, they would also expect 
‘that in the event of an agreement the British Government will speak up for the continuing 
membership of Great Britain in the EEC’.122 
In light of such continuing uncertainties, Schmidt worked closely with Giscard to 
transform the renegotiations into a presentable outcome for himself, with his own domestic 
preoccupations increasingly taking centre stage. At a Franco-German plenary session in 
February 1975, Giscard and Schmidt agreed with the assembled ministers to set up a secret 
Franco-German expert group, comprised of one official each from the respective Foreign and 
Finance Ministries, in order to work out a joint position for Dublin. If anything leaked, the 
group’s objective should be described as ‘merely a comparison of financial tables’. While they 
agreed to support the Commission’s compromise formula that had been produced following 
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the Paris summit in principle, they nonetheless wanted to minimize their own financial 
contributions significantly, trying to couple the corrective formula to VAT and limiting its 
application to seven years.123 For Schmidt, the prime objective by now had become to ensure 
that the renewed Franco-German axis would survive the final hurdle of the renegotiations. At 
the final ministerial meeting prior to Dublin, he told his Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher and Finance Minister Apel that it was ‘not sure whether one could bring Great Britain 
to positive behaviour. This makes it all the more important that there would be no rift in our 
relationship with France too, which is why we have to clear our behaviour with France at every 
stage’. Schmidt then ruled that the total financial impact of German contributions should be cut 
at 250 million European Units of Account [EUA] first; if necessary, it could be upgraded to 275 
million EUAs. The final German fall-back position would be 300 million EUAs, significantly less 
than the Commission’s formula which the Germans had estimated to cost them at least 420 
million EUAs.124 Immediately prior to the summit, Schmidt then cleared these numbers with 
Giscard over the phone.125 He also phoned Wilson to warn him that ‘the size of the refund is the 
thing which matters more than other things. And we are figuring a size of not more than one 
quarter billion units of account which means 250 million units of account’. He professed to have 
had ‘great difficulties within my own Cabinet …  – 250 million units of account and I am pretty 
sure that Valery Giscard will buy that order of magnitude’.126  
As a result, it is no surprise that the European Council at Dublin on 10-11 March 1975 
quickly became dead-locked in essentially insignificant posturing for Wilson’s and Schmidt’s 
respective audiences at home. Schmidt started off by brusquely asserting that ‘the order of 
magnitude of the refund was too big for him’. Germany ‘could not finance all the costly 
inventions of the Commission at a time when their GNP was stagnating’, since these costs 
significantly ‘affected the implementation of Germany's domestic policies’. After all, ‘he was 
facing elections in Germany also’ and had ‘no intention of losing his Minister of Finance’. 
Giscard predictably came to help, finding Schmidt’s proposal ‘for a certain limit for transfers to 
be very positive’.127 Throughout the discussions, Schmidt would not budge. In his handwritten 
notes, he scribbled down and underlined repeatedly that this was not a question for Brussels 
technocrats but about German taxpayers’ money.128 Wilson, by contrast, now seemed to have 
lost all interest in the budget question. When Michael Butler, the FCO’s senior official present 
at Dublin, claimed that the Germans had proposed ‘conditions for the corrective mechanism 
which, they hoped and believed, were unlikely to be fulfilled’, Wilson was simply ‘not interested’ 
and went ‘back into the meeting and accepted the German draft’ before once again trying to 
shift focus on the Commonwealth question.129 As a result, the final corrective formula was 
capped at a ceiling of 250 EUAs, the Franco-German starting position.130 Wilson did gain better 
access to EC markets for New Zealand butter until 1980, but not for lamb; the question of 
cheese imports after 1977 was left open. For Schmidt, as he later told the SPD’s executive, the 
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most important outcome was that the mutually acceptable compromise had been reached 
‘without putting our relationship with France under strain’.131   
Conclusions 
On 5 June 1975, a total of 17,378,581 Britons voted that Britain should remain member 
of the European Community, against a ‘no’ vote of only 8,470,073. This huge majority of 67.2 
per cent, as Wilson was keen to point out in his memoirs, was bigger ‘than has been received by 
any Government in any general election’.132 Not only did it allow Wilson to claim that the full-
hearted consent of the British people to British membership had now finally been obtained, but 
it also weakened the left-wing of his party, allowing him to move Tony Benn from the 
Department of Industry to Energy.133 Viewed from such a domestic perspective, Wilson’s 
successes were indeed remarkable, and his biographer offers suitable eulogia: Wilson 
‘brilliantly succeeded where Ramsay MacDonald had failed, and created a national consensus in 
favour of his Cabinet’s policy, overrode the declared wishes of the Labour Party and many of his 
own ministers, yet avoided either a government collapse or an irreconcilable split within the 
Movement … and did so in such a way that it was impossible for anybody except die-hard antis 
to argue that he had acted unfairly’.134 Yet, even though these assessments have since been 
largely mirrored in the emerging historiography, many of Wilson’s alleged achievements turned 
out to be pyrrhic victories in the long term. The renegotiated terms soon turned out to be 
largely cosmetic, with the allegedly hard-fought budget deal in particular not producing ‘any 
benefit whatsoever to the United Kingdom’, thanks to the many conditions attached to it by the 
French and Germans.135 Neither did Wilson really obtain the ‘full-hearted consent’ of the British 
people, as he professed to have done: by deliberately focusing the domestic debate on the 
terms of membership, he consciously side-lined bigger issues of sovereignty and Britain’s post-
imperial role, thereby leaving himself open to subsequent accusations of somehow having 
tricked the British public into membership.136 Even with regards to the Labour Party, the 
renegotiation episode only calmed down tensions temporarily – before long, it was again 
hopelessly divided over the European question, which heavily contributed to its eventual split 
of 1981.137  
The more lasting impact of the renegotiations lies in the fact that they drastically 
undermined Britain’s standing inside the EC. They strongly reinforced doubts over British 
reliability and the country’s future role in Europe at a crucial historical juncture, establishing an 
‘awkward partner’ narrative that has since become ingrained in Continental perceptions of 
Britain’s European policy.138 In so doing, they contributed to the re-emergence of the Franco-
German axis under Schmidt and Giscard, leading to a British self-marginalization in Europe that 
has similarly been of more lasting nature. With the Gaullist challenge finally overcome and a 
largely benevolent U.S. administration under President Ford, the British renegotiations were 
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one of the few noisy disturbances in a period that was otherwise marked by a degree of 
‘striking transatlantic cooperation’ contrasting starkly with the more troubled periods before 
and afterwards.139 At a time of renewed U.S.-European cooperation and harmony, Britain now 
suddenly seemed like the odd one out in the Western alliance. Throughout Schmidt’s 
chancellorship, Anglo-German tensions over Europe would remain a recurrent theme, such as 
over British non-participation in the European Monetary System in 1978 or Thatcher’s 
reopening of the budget debate in 1979-83. Indeed, Schmidt recently declared on German 
television that Wilson and Thatcher were ‘the two people that convinced me that I had been 
wrong in the 1960s when I thought we had to admit the English in any case, even against de 
Gaulle’s will. Subsequently, I have come to agree with de Gaulle’.140 
In asking what triggered these developments, the article has focused in particular on the 
high-level encounters of Schmidt and Wilson, and the way in which the British PM’s 
prioritization of domestic and party-political considerations often resulted in an unclear and 
contradictory European policy. It may well be the case that Wilson’s opportunistic stance in fact 
constituted the only possibility to keep Britain in Europe; yet, it was also a stance that went 
directly against Schmidt’s own domestic needs, dashing German hopes for a positive and 
constructive British voice in European politics after the country’s belated accession. In this 
regard, Schmidt’s gradual erosion of trust in Wilson’s personal leadership and ultimate 
intentions contrasted unfavourably with the developing relationship between Schmidt and 
Giscard, whose close and confidential cooperation relied to a large extent on personal 
diplomacy and often circumvented official channels of communication.141 True, a different 
British approach would probably not have resulted in a different outcome of the renegotiations; 
but it may well have avoided the profound sense of distrust and suspicion the exercise created 
amongst other EC member-states. Had Wilson performed the game of high-level diplomacy 
with Schmidt and Giscard more effectively, the renegotiations could perhaps have been 
brushed aside as what Wilson intended them to be from the very outset: tiresome but 
necessary shadow-boxing to ensure Britain’s long-term membership of the EC. Yet, Wilson 
disguised his ultimate intensions all too well: preoccupied with his domestic situation, he 
remained an ungraspable enigma for Schmidt and Giscard throughout his time in office. 
Ultimately, this was a failure of communication on the highest level; but it is a failure that has 
since become a recurrent feature in Britain’s relationship with Europe.  
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